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SIMILAR ACCIDENTS: LESSONS LEARNED? COUNTERMEASURES!
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Captain Kevin M. Smith
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The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily
represent the positions or policies of any private, public or governmental organizations.
All-too-many accidents in the past decade have major similarities. Yet, we continue to have these
accidents. Are there countermeasures to reduce the risks of similar (or non-similar) accidents ? We
propose a differing view of accident causation that can lend itself to preventing future accidents
and uncovering more generalizable causes. Many accident reports fall back on the standard panacea
for accident prevention: training. Training is a large part of the answer in accident prevention, but
only very specialized, focused decision performance training with rigorous evaluation. We will
show a template for such training and evaluation as another countermeasure, one that provides a
uniform approach and guidelines for flight simulator scenarios (LOFT). However, we have
concluded that even these efforts at a optimum solution still may fall short. We look towards an
automation-based, threat identification/risk management cockpit display, incorporating all of the
above to prevent runway excursions and other CFIT.
Aviation safety demands accident prevention. Today, we have the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) tasked with investigating major accidents, and each military service has a Safety Center
investigating their own aviation accidents. All produce reports seeking to identify causation and
recommend changes to preclude future accidents. Yet, we have hit a 40 year plateau in the accident rate,
which may indeed be slightly rising. Why? The focus here will be on what is now called runway
excursions - usually overruns after landing - which continue to be by far the most common type of aircraft
accident, normally leading to aircraft damage, and, on occasion involving fatalities. To date, no reports
seem to have impacted runway excursions. The level of concern with excursions has reached a stage
where the FAA is doing a study, led by Dr. Kathy Abbott, on such excursions: "Operational Use of
Flightpath Management Systems." While not yet finished, preliminary findings suggest flightcrew have
never been properly trained to operate highly automated aircraft. Perhaps they cannot, at present, be
effectively trained, the FAA report implies, because there are no checklists for many of the automationrelated problems that pilots frequently encounter. This leaves them having to manage using ingenuity.
The authors believe that a decision-making in the operational environment is a lacuna in training; such
training and evaluation in specially-designed LOFT scenarios may overcome the need for instantaneous
ingenuity. The authors' have written often, beginning in 1993, Lofaro and Smith (1993), and continuing
even now, that the overarching issue in safety was actually that of decision making; that risk identification
and management is the primary role of the captain/flight crew; that decision making is the functional
aspect of risk management. To resume: the FAA report's message is that regular systemic failings in
training, identified in real operations, show that airline operations today contain an identified potential for
hundreds of latent accidents and incidents unless changes are made. (the authors heartily concur). Recent
runway excursions will be quickly examined for similarities in conditions, actions, consequences. This
paper will discuss accident causality models and generalizability of findings. Next, using the literature,
indicate generic but effective training modalities of accident prevention for this spate of similar accidents
and for any accident with similar conditions. These modalities are embedded in a framework for generic
accident prevention training and evaluation based on decision performance, and refer to a template for

flight simulator ( FS) LOFT scenario design that allows for both flight control and cognitive (CRM/
human factors) skills with evaluation. Finally, the paper will attempt a step into the future as we now
believe that training, practice, evaluation may need another, more direct, boost. This paper proposes a
mission adaptive, real-time, collaborative dispatch-flightcrew display; a display that enables both threat
identification and risk management (TIRM), and is an accurate decision-making aid. We will lay out a
template and protocol for developing an automation-based, threat identification/risk management cockpit
display and its placement an existing cockpit display. We would be remiss if we did not give several
caveats: The paper is limited to 6 pages. This will preclude detailed presentation, analyses and
argumentation, and will also preclude presentation of most material from NTSB (Reports are available at
www.ntsb.gov).

Several Similar Accidents
Accident One
Southwest Airlines flight #1248 attempted a landing at Chicago's Midway International airport in
adverse conditions, rolled through a blast fence, an airport perimeter fence, across a crowded adjacent
roadway striking several passenger automobiles. One bystander's life was lost; he was parked on a street
across from the airport perimeter fence, several people on-board seriously injured, and property
destroyed. The conditions, at the time of the approach and attempted landing were low visibility and
falling snow, compounded by the fact that the runway was slippery and braking action advisories were in
effect. The Captain had about a 200 foot ceiling and ½ mile visibility, close to CAT 1 minimums, and
unfavorable wind conditions, with a short runway. When the factors are combined (cumulative risk), the
Captain had an aircraft that was outside normal conditions and into non-normal/emergency operating
conditions: high risk. The touch-down point was at 4,500 feet down the 6,502 foot runway, when (with
the plane's weight and speed) it would have needed 5,300 to safely stop. At touch- down, the plane was
slightly over the speed for landing, and had there not been some dryer runway conditions on portions of
the runway, the plane would have had an excursion that may have ended by crashed into the building
across the street with resultant loss of lives and injuries.
Accident Two
American Airlines (AA 331) attempting to land in Kingston, Jamaica, in heavy rain, departed the
runway, blasted through a fence, skidded across a road. It broke apart and halted a scant 40 feet from the
Caribbean Sea. This flight did result in four serious injuries, all to passengers. A quick aside: at the
writing of this Chapter, there is no NTSB report, preliminary or final, available. The data presented comes
from various news services. The crew had contacted Jamaica Air Traffic Control (ATC) to request the
Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach for Runway 12. ATC, however, advised them of tailwind
conditions on Runway 12 and offered a circling approach for landing on Runway 30. The crew repeated
their request for Runway 12 and were subsequently cleared to land on that runway with the controller
further advising the crew that the runway was "contaminated" (wet). When the risk factors are combined,
the Captain had an aircraft that was outside normal conditions and into non-normal/emergency operating
conditions and, therefore at high risk. Because of the 14 knot tailwind, groundspeed at landing was 162
knots (186 mph), far above the recommended landing speed for this aircraft. The aircraft, with a heavy
fuel load, touched down some 4,100 feet down the 8,910 feet long runway. Normal touchdown would be
between 1,000 feet and 1,500 feet. The flight crew, with an over-the-limit tailwind, "decided" to landed
"long and hot" on a contaminated runway with no overrun.

Other accidents
Yet, the above are far from the total runway excursions in the past decade or so. American Airlines
(AA) flight 1420 had a very similar disaster in 1999, at Little Rock, AK. The Captain continued an
approach when severe thunderstorms were in/over the airport, the crosswind was over AA limits for a
crosswind landing, the spoilers were not deployed on touchdown. The plane overran the runway, crashed
into light poles and ILS stanchions and eleven persons died, with score of injuries. Southwest Airlines
already had an runway overrun accident ( SW 1455) in the year 2000 as did American (AA flight 2253) in
2010. There are many others: One-Two-Thee flight 269; Kingfisher flight 4124 and more. All had similar
approach and runway conditions. None attempted a missed approach/go-round; diversion to alternate.

Similarities
Given the conditions, these landing should never have been attempted. But, there was no attempt to
abandon the approach/ landing and then proceed to the assigned alternate. As a last resort, they could
have pulled up and declared a missed approach. Why did not they divert enroute, or abandon the
approach, or reject the landing and proceed to the alternate? What occurred in these accidents is series of
either non-decisions or poor decisions, culminating in the attempt to shoot the landing. The plane/crew, as
per our ODM and risking risk paradigms, Lofaro and Smith, (1993, 1998); Smith and Lofaro (2001b,
2003), were at high risk. But, they were seemingly unaware of, or unconcerned with, risk. They were
dealing with one condition at a time and seeing if they could legally attempt a landing. But, rising risk is
additive/cumulative. While we tend to think of one risk factor at a time, like wind or visibility, the reality
is a cumulative effect that occurs when the real impact of the conditions are taken together, resulting in a
much higher risk level than the conditions taken as discrete events. This was not done and the price was
paid each time.
Accident Causation
These accidents could be a result of a cognitive-based pair of causes: "plan continuation bias" and
workload/overload. In times of stress, the decision maker will choose from among all the information
available only those facts which support a preconceived solution, "tunnel vision," i.e., functional fixation
and decision bias. As overload occurs, the first action is to prioritize, then shed tasks to reduce overload.
These two cognitive (dis)functions can work together, especially in the absence of any decision-making
model and training. But, the lack of operational decision making skills and training are the root causes.
Why the emphasis on decision-making? It is patently clear that before any action, or non-action, occurs a
decision is made or a decision point is missed. An Aviation Week & Space Technology article by Taverna
and Gallagher (2010) clearly states that, in future cockpits, there are needs for "collaborative decisionmaking," "aids to decision making," and "cognitive resource management." We later will propose an
attempt to meet these needs. The current paradigm in use for finding accident causes is a linear path, often
referred to as a causal chain. There are two problems with this: the first being that any accident is a
compendium of, almost entirely one-off conditions, personnel and actions. Finding out, even if accurately,
what caused airplane X to crash is a snapshot in time; a snapshot that can never be replicated. Minimal, if
any, generalizable knowledge inheres in the accident findings. Before we get bombarded with critiques,
we do not deny some generalizable knowledge may occur, the operative words being "some " and "may."
The second problem we see with accident investigations refers back to the linear pathway viewpoint. We
posit that an accident is more on the order of a mosaic, whose pieces are composed of personnel, actions,
conditions; a mosaic that can have many ways of fitting the pieces together, with no real negative
consequences. But, there exists one or more ways where the "fit" results in an accident. Put another way,
there can prior poor decisions and behaviors that seemingly “worked” in the past (blind luck? the “not
your day to die” phenomenon?), but, at some point in time, with changed conditions, the fit of these

previous decisions and actions no longer make a viable mosaic resulting in an accident. Is there a
causation schema that can be more generalizable-at the very least for excursions?

Operational Decision Making and Accident Analysis
This will be a short section; please see full-up exposition at Lofaro and Smith (2008). Since 1993,
we have been presenting/publishing on the concepts of a rising risk continuum, the critical mission factors
that would make risk rise, and the pilot/crew's primary function of mission of risk identification and risk
management. Since approximately the early 2000's, the concept of risk management as an integral part of
aviation safety finally seems to have emerged. Over the past 18 years, we have developed an operational
decision-making paradigm (ODM) as the way for a flightcrew, in-flight, to identify/manage risk and thus
complete the mission safely. ODM is the process, often under time pressure and often with little or no
margin for error, that is the functional aspect of risk management by the pilot. ODM involves integrating
SA with the recognition and assessment of those factors that are critical to safe flight in order to identify
and respond to the risk. If the level of risk rises, effective risk reduction strategies need to be employed to
keep that risk within manageable limits.

Components of the ODM Model
The ODM components are: 1.The Operational Envelope (Mission Space). 2. Situational
Knowledge/Risk Location (Location within the Ops Envelope). 3. The Critical Mission Impact Areas and
the Critical Mission Factors which comprise the Impact Areas/Risk Location (Hostile Agents invading the
Mission Space). 4. The Rising Risk Continuum/Risk Location and 5. Cumulative effect (a concept whose
use is embedded throughout all the above components). It must be strongly noted that all of these
components are so intertwined that any separation or sequencing of them is artificial. Integrated
throughout the model is the pilot's role as risk manager. We refer the reader to Smith and Lofaro (2001);
Lofaro and Smith (2008). We have used ODM as an accident causation tool and shown it to be effective
across almost all types of accidents; all involve a set of decisions, see Smith and Lofaro (2009
Workbook). However, we have come to believe that even ODM training and specially designed LOFT
scenarios and evaluation are not the whole answer. Having said that, we still go to...

LOFT Design and Components
Again, this will be a short section; again, please see Lofaro and Smith,( 2008). We need to get to the
crux of this paper: a mission adaptive, real-time, collaborative dispatch-flightcrew display; a display that
enables threat identification, risk management, and is an accurate decision-making aid. Flying is an
integrated, mission-oriented activity and must be evaluated as such. In the early 1990's, Captain Smith
created the framework for a model that demonstrated the CRM human factors skills and the flight control
skills are interrelated, interdependent, and often simultaneous in execution. Flight proficiency skills and
knowledge are interwoven, interdependent, and necessarily interact with the CRM skills/knowledge
differentially across tasks and conditions. These interactions can be identified/specified by a matrix-type
crew mission performance model (MPM) using the tasks, which comprise a mission/flight leg; this we
term Integrated CRM, (Lofaro, 1992a). Added to Integrated CRM is the Mission Performance Model
(MPM) which relates directly to LOFT design and flightcrew evaluation while "flying" a LOF. By using
the behavioral markers (behaviorally-anchored descriptors) that make up both the CRM and flight control
skills clusters, a LOFT can be designed where the MPM and the ODM are used as structural base. Such
LOFT's can be evaluated by using the behaviorally-anchored descriptors mentioned above. Yet, as with
the ODM, we again came to believe that even such specialized LOFT training is not the whole answer; on
to...

An Automation-Based, Threat Identification/Risk Management (TIRM) Cockpit Display
We may be accused of attempting to find that fool's gold: an error-proof (idiot-proof?) system for
safety. Be that as it may, our proposal is to incorporate within the Dispatch-Cockpit system a software
tool, with cockpit display, that is designed to quickly and easily communicate mission risk. Such a
display tool could be used interactively enroute to bring to the Captain's situational awareness the riskladen factors that could have a detrimental effect to mission success. Space precludes all but an outline for
such an onboard risk management display which we would call a threat display, albeit threat displays for
the air transport mission may sound bizarre. However, if one takes a look at a modern cockpit, there are
already some sophisticated threat displays. As one example, TCAS II. Adverse winds are, in the ODM
model, listed as a hostile agent, i.e., a threat. In fact, windshear is adverse winds and there also currently
is a cockpit display for it.

The What and the Where
During the mission planning phase, preload and make visible all current and known mission critical
factors/hostile agents. This risk data can be uploaded to the cockpit along with the flight planning forecast
(FPF). Next, update risk relevant mission critical factors/hostile agents en route. Dispatchers maintain
contact with flight crews after they are airborne to keep them advised of weather conditions, alternate
landing plans, and necessary changes in altitude. Dispatchers have many sources of information that are
unique, such as holding times, discussions with a crew that just landed ahead of your flight, etc. The
Dispatcher can feed the Captain updated, risk relevant information into his and the cockpit's risk
displays, as well as legal parameters. As a corollary: The Captain would also, as they are encountered enroute, downlink any critical mission factors to Dispatch. Thus, both the flight crews and Dispatch must
identify various intervening factors as hostile agents from the critical mission factors/hostile agents.
An in-flight risk management display could be integrated into the lower engine indicator and crew
alerting system (EICAS) of the cockpit display system and be connected to a similar display utilized by
the Dispatcher. This display would show a series of three lights: green yellow and red.
Green light----- Risk is Low; normal operations prevail; continue mission as planned.
Yellow Light---Risk has risen to Moderate; one or more mission critical factors are in play and have,
or will impact flight safety (e.g. windshear advisories at destination airport). Some modification to flight
plan needed.
Red Light----Risk level has risen to High. At least three mission critical factors are in play.
Significant alterations to the mission flight plan are urgently required. Example: At any point in time, the
dispatcher doing flight following would uplink the illuminated light display, say the yellow light. The
Captain could then query the illuminated light to see what has changed and what factors are involved.
Say severe turbulence over Iceland was reported by Air France, with resultant on-board injuries. The
Captain would either agree to the yellow, or red light, by pushing on the light. If a collaborative
modification is developed and agreed-on, the dispatcher would then uplink a reroute away from the severe
turbulence, with new fuel calculations. But, if the Captain did not agree to the color-related risk factors,
he would not push any light. Thus, there is no degradation of what is called Captain's authority, as per
Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 91.3.

The How
Begin with joint and interactive training of flight crew and Dispatch of a shared mental model that
flight crew and dispatch would use; the ODM. It can be used in the mission planning stage and, in the enroute stage of a flight. Part of this training would be on how to use model. The difficult part is developing
a software-driven, cockpit display; the TIRM. ODM-trained Captains and Dispatch personnel could be
used here along with software engineers in a set of workshops using a knowledge engineering technique

called Small-Group Delphi Paradigm, (Lofaro, 1992b) in this effort. Next would come usability testing
involving both dispatch and flight crew, (Maliko-Abraham and Lofaro, 2001a). The final step is
implementation. The first air carrier to develop and test this new approach would both serve as a trial case
and as a proof of concept. Such dispatch/cockpit crew integration would be entirely at the discretion of
each air carrier.

Summary
The pilot/flightcrew's prime function is risk identification, assessment and action. This occurs in an
time-compressed, unforgiving, decision making environment. We began with a decision making model
(ODM) for training, then went to a specialized LOFT design and crew evaluation template where accident
analysis can provides data of use in LOFT design. We went a step beyond by proposing the design and
develop of an automated cockpit display based on the ODM. A cockpit display warning system that uplinks with Dispatch enabling a collaborative ground-air decision making process. Such an automated
cockpit display (TIRM) can enable the pilot/flightcrew to make decisions based on accurate identification
and assessment of risks. We see the end result (the TIRM display) as a decision aid in identifying and
managing risk, thereby reducing risk to the aircraft and all onboard. Aviation safety and the flying public
are the beneficiaries.
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